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Abstract 
Estimating the cost of capital for energy network utilities is critical because it 
directly effects decisions energy regulators make. The regulators have to estimate and 
allow a reasonable rate of return for network utilities as part of their duties under 
national laws, while balancing the protection of consumers and allowing an acceptable 
return to network investors. There is no generally accepted method applicable in all 
countries. Consequently, there is a need to review the estimation methods from the 
regulator's perspective, especially how to estimate an acceptable return if the network 
utility has an ownership structure with different return interests. Unfortunately, the 
available models provide either industry based or countrywide cost of capital values 
and do not consider different return expectations of network utility shareholders. 
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Enerji Şebeke Şirketleri İçin Sermaye Maliyetinin Tahmini: Düzenleme 
Kurumları Açısından İncelenmesi 
Özet 
Enerji şebeke şirketleri için sermaye maliyetinin tahmin edilmesi, enerji piyasası 
düzenleme kurumlarının aldıkları kararları doğrudan etkilediğinden kritik bir konudur. 
Enerji piyasası düzenleme kurumları, ulusal kanunlar ile belirlenen görevleri 
çerçevesinde, bir taraftan tüketicilerin haklarını diğer taraftan yatırımcılara kabul 
edilebilir getiri sağlayacak şekilde enerji şebeke şirketleri için makul bir getiri oranı 
belirlemek durumundadır. Tüm ülkelerde uygulanabilecek genel kabul görmüş bir 
tahmin yöntemi bulunmamaktadır. Özellikle farklı getiri beklentisine sahip ortaklık 
yapısına sahip enerji şirketi için sermaye maliyetinin tahmininin düzenleme kurumları 
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açısından incelenmesine ihtiyaç bulunmaktadır. Ancak mevcut tahmin yöntemleri ya 
endüstri bazında ya da ülke bazında sermaye maliyeti değerleri sağlamakta olup şebeke 
şirketlerinin hissedarlarının farklı getiri bekletilerini dikkate almamaktadır. 
Anahtar Sözcükler: Sermaye Maliyeti, Enerji Düzenleme, Enerji Şirketleri 
JEL Sınıflandırma Kodları: G30, G32, G38 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Energy network business is regulated in most countries to prevent the unfair 
implementation of network connection and use of system charges. In general, 
the task of regulation is carried out by national regulatory agencies. The 
regulator is authorized by national laws to allow a fair and reasonable rate of 
return to the network utility while also considering the rights, and protecting the 
interests of customers. In this respect, the cost of capital is the key regulatory 
instrument for the energy regulator. 
As discussed in detail in later sections, there is no method applicable in all 
countries. Different parties apply different methods with different interpretation 
of input data. This issue is a complex and difficult task for regulators in 
developing markets. Then there is an obvious need to review estimation 
methods from the regulator's perspective. Therefore, the main purpose of this 
article is to introduce key issues in estimating the cost of capital and emphasize 
the difficulties in the estimation. 
This study is structured as follows. The second section covers the 
importance of, and main debates about the cost of capital in tariff regulation. 
The third section introduces and discusses methods for estimating the cost of 
capital. The fourth section explains the common methodology in setting the cost 
of capital. The fifth section evaluates the models from the regulator's viewpoint. 
The sixth section discusses whether the methods can be applied in developing 
markets and gives a short summary of approaches and models with global 
applicability. The seventh section calculates capital cost for two energy utilities 
in Turkey. The eight section makes some suggestions to regulatory agencies. 
Finally, the last section provides additional remarks and concludes the article. 
2. Main debates about the cost of capital 
Tariff regulation, basically, involves the regulation and monitoring of the 
wealth created by energy utilities through tariffs. Depending on the type of 
regulation, utilities are allowed to realize a certain level of profits. In order to 
accomplish regulatory targets and control the profits of regulated utilities, the 
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cost of capital becomes one of the key instruments. In this regard, the cost of 
capital is a powerful regulatory tool whether the rate of return or incentive 
based regulation is used as a regulatory policy (Grout, 1994). 
As stated by Grout (1994), the role of the cost of capital is not the same for 
each regulatory regime. Under the rate of return regulation, the rate of return is 
set equal to the cost of capital. Although the cost of capital is one of the factors 
in the formulation of price and revenue caps, certain flexibility is given to the 
regulated utility. Therefore, the impact of cost of capital on the utility is 
expected to be relatively lower when the rate of return regulation is applied. 
Furthermore, Rocha et al. (2007) highlight that regulator take great care in 
setting the rate of return under the price cap regime in highly volatile 
economies. According to Alexander and Irwin (1996), these realities present 
evidence for utilities regulated by incentive based regulation to require higher 
rates of return from their investments. 
The typical tariff regulatory framework can be illustrated by means of the 
formula given below (Bosselman et al., 2000). 
  
 (1) 
In Eq. 1, RR is the revenue requirement; OE is the total operating expenses 
including depreciation, OEadj is the expenses deductable for tax purposes, T is 
the effective tax rate, Rd is the cost of debt, D is the quantity of debt, (Rd*D) is 
the interest payable on the utility’s outstanding debt securities, RAB is the 
regulatory asset base, and R is the allowed return on RAB. 
The product of (RAB*R) is intended to capture the cost of the capital 
invested in assets required to provide services. It is usually guided by the 
principle that the end result of its determination must be fair and reasonable 
from the viewpoints of both investors and consumers (Patterson, 1995). While it 
is critical to protect consumers from the pricing behavior of natural 
monopolists, the energy regulator has the duty to ensure that the utility can 
finance its operations and remain in business. 
The regulatory agency has complete control over the allowed rate of return 
“R” when compared with other items in the revenue requirement formula (Crew 
and Kleindorfer, 1979; Bakovic et al., 2003). In other words, the regulator must 
balance the needs of consumers with the needs of investors to obtain fair returns 
on investment. Alexander et al. (2000) state that determining a fair and 
   RAB*R*TDROERROERR dadj 
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reasonable level of allowed profits can lead to two situations. The first is the 
one that the utility will not want to invest under the allowance of low rate of 
return. The second is a situation where the utility will over-invest3 and/or make 
huge profits if a high level of return has been allowed (Averch and Johnson, 
1962; Weyman-Jones, 1994). 
In incentive-based regulation, rate of return considerations are implicit in 
setting and resetting the parameters. It is clear that regulators pay close attention 
to these issues when setting quality and efficiency parameters of incentive based 
regulation. Otherwise, shareholders will likely be unwilling to invest in sunk 
assets if they are only allowed to gain rates of return that are below the cost of 
capital. However allocative efficiency requires that the rate of return is equal to 
the cost of capital (Armstrong, et al., 1998). 
In addition to protecting the interests of both consumers and investors by 
tariff regulation, some authors underline the importance of factors summarized 
in Table 1 when estimating the cost of capital. 
                                                        
3 It is also called as Aversch-Johnson effect. 
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Table 1. Factors relevant to estimating the cost of capital 
Author Issues 
1) It is important to note whether the cost of capital is applied to a particular 
company or a group of companies. If the cost of capital is for a group of 
companies, the specific composition of the group companies need 
consideration. If the cost of capital is for a particular efficient company with 
easy access to lower cost of financing, allowing a lower rate of return for that 
utility will likely mean penalizing its efficiency. 
2) Before estimating the cost of capital, whether the interest is in the cost of 
capital at historical or present costs is a question that needs to be answered. In 
practice, the cost of debt depends on the historical cost while the cost of equity 
is estimated at the current rate. 
3) Estimating the cost of equity is not easy due to difficulties in anticipating 
investors' return expectations. The actual cost of capital can deviate from the 
estimated cost. 
4) There can be inconsistency between RAB and the cost of equity capital. If 
RAB is valued at book value and the cost of equity is based on the market 
value, the two factors are not determined in a consistent manner. 
Kahn (1989) 
5) The effect of the capital structure on the cost of capital is not considered in 
cost of capital estimations. It is generally agreed that the cost of capital can be 
reduced by leveraging up to a certain level because of tax effects of debt 
financing. 
1) The cost of capital affects the selection of technology and has an important 
bearing on the long-term economic performance of the British economy. The 
higher the cost of capital, the more the future is discounted. 
Helm (1995a) 
2) The cost of capital for utilities is higher in the UK than in a number of other 
developed countries. Thus RPI-Xa system is costly to customers in the long run. 
Helm (1995b) The cost of capital is not static and subject to vary depending on changes in the 
expectations of investorsb. Fixing the cost of capital at a particular point in time 
for the next implementation period means that the cost of capital will not be 
reassessed because there is no explicit revision mechanism between periods. 
1) The level of capital cost should not encourage waste production. 
2) The level of capital cost should not encourage uses that are threatening to 
the environment or energy resource base. 
Bosselman et al. 
(2000) 
3) The level of capital cost should protect public interests. 
1) The choice of implementing a uniform or different cost of capital for 
utilities would become an issue of debatec. 
Bakovic et al. 
(2003) 
2) The risk in the estimation of the cost of capital is listed as one of the major 
risks for electricity distribution companies and their lenders. 
Brigham and 
Ehrhardt (2005) 
A key factor in selecting the mixture of debt and equity in corporate finance. 
a It is an incentive-based method developed in the UK. b For additional reading, see Gordon 
(1974). 
c Bakovic et al. (2003) gives an example of a dispute raised in Colombia following the 
privatization of electricity distribution assets and in that dispute, the issue of implementing a 
uniform or different rate of return for utilities is debated among the concerned parties. 
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It is important to note that incentive based regulation does not lessen the 
importance of estimating the cost of capital, but requires careful thought and 
dynamic monitoring. The rate of return regulation allows that either the utility 
or the regulator opens discussion at any time to revise the allowed rate of return 
depending on market movements. This flexibility helps to protect the interests 
of utility investors under rate of return regulation. 
However, as noted by Helm (1995b), incentive based regulation does not 
allow such an adjustment once the implementation period starts. Adverse 
market movements could significantly disrupt the profitability of the utility and 
result in lower return levels than investors' expectations. Being natural 
monopolies in their designated regions, energy network utilities must remain in 
business to ensure the uninterrupted supply of energy to end-users and the 
proper functioning of the market. This puts network utilities in a central 
position. Setting an attractive return at the beginning of each implementation 
period is an important task. But monitoring the utility's profitability becomes 
more critical when the market is volatile. Otherwise, the investment in network 
utilities would be more risky for investors. This is an issue that the regulators 
have to deal with in applying incentive-based regulation. 
3. Estimation of cost of capital 
For simplicity, the cost of capital can be broken into two main components: 
1) the cost of debt and 2) the cost of money received by the utility in exchange 
for its stock or equity. The equity capital of a utility would be of two types: 
preferred and common. Since the earnings provided to both debt and preferred 
equity holders are usually known, common equity providers face the highest 
risk. Unlike debt and preferred equity, common stock holders are not entitled to 
any agreed or assured rate of return in advance on their investment. Common 
equity holders are paid from revenues after all debt and preferred investors of 
the utility have been paid. The remainder to common equity holders would be 
relatively low or even a negative value when compared to the level of risk they 
assume. For this reason, the cost of equity is difficult to measure. 
Because the cost of equity is rarely observed directly from the market, it 
must be estimated and requires a forward-looking approach. Different methods 
can be used to calculate the cost of equity, such as comparative earnings, risk 
premium approach, Discounted Cash Flow (DCF), Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM) and Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) (Myers and Borucki, 1994). 
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3.1 Comparative earnings 
In this method, the cost of equity is calculated based on book values of 
comparable companies. Nevertheless, it is not free of errors and disadvantages. 
First, it is difficult to find comparable companies since no two companies are 
identical even they are in the same business with the same shareholder structure. 
In addition, as stated earlier, the concept of cost of equity is market oriented. 
However, in this method, the cost of equity is calculated by using earnings 
based on book value. That is why this method provides cost of equity figures, 
which are independent from market movements. 
Theoretically speaking, many comparative earnings ratios could be 
developed. However, in practice, the price-earnings ratio is frequently used. The 
expected earnings per share of the firms are multiplied by the appropriate price-
earnings ratio based on the firm’s risk and industry to determine the appropriate 
price of the firm’s stock. Once the stock price is determined, the cost of equity 
is calculated by the same methodology of DCF. Although this method is easy to 
use, it is subject to some limitations when applied to emerging market stocks. 
The price-earnings ratio for a given industry may change continuously in these 
markets, especially when there are a few firms in the industry. Thus, it is 
difficult to determine the proper price-earnings ratio that should be applied to a 
utility in a developing market. 
As pointed out by Madura (2008), the price-earnings ratio for a particular 
industry may need to be adjusted for the firm’s country, since the firm’s 
accounting guidelines and tax laws can influence reported earnings. 
Importantly, the implementation of price-earnings ratio is only possible under 
the assumption of efficient and perfect market conditions, which are lacking in 
developing markets. 
3.2 Risk premium approach 
In this approach, a risk premium is added to the long-term debt rate to 
calculate the cost of equity. The long-term debt rate can be obtained from the 
market. But there is still a need to estimate a premium reflecting the risk of 
equity. This approach is relatively easy to apply because only two parameters 
are needed. If the country issues the relevant debt instruments, then the only 
parameter required is the equity risk premium. 
For matured markets, the data for equity risk premium is comparatively 
easy to determine in spite of controversial comments on the calculation of the 
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true equity premium. However, this data could be a burden for other markets. 
For this purpose, as an alternative, the study by Voll et al. (1998) regarding the 
cost of capital calculation for electricity distribution utilities in India sets the 
premium equal to the global market risk premium, assuming the U.S. market 
representing the global market. In addition, the study calculates the cost of 
equity by adding the cost of equity for a U.S. utility and the country risk 
premium. 
3.3 DCF 
DCF is the most widely used method to determine the cost of equity for 
regulated utilities in the U.S. In this method, the cost of equity is formulated as 
the expected rate of return demanded by investors in the regulated utilities’ 
equity capital. Then the rate of return is estimated as the sum of the current 
dividend yield and a long-term growth rate of dividends per share (Myers and 
Borucki, 1994). 
The DCF formula is theoretically sound and simple to use, but it is 
obviously only applicable to utilities that pay dividends. It will give acceptable 
results only if the forecasted dividends grow at a constant rate infinitely. This 
assumption is criticized because no firm can grow forever at a rate exceeding 
the average growth of the economy (Franks and Broyles, 1979). On the other 
hand, Damodaran (2010a) points to the fact that the long-term expected growth 
rate is the most difficult parameter to estimate for emerging markets. 
Based on simplifying assumptions, DCF is associated with practical 
problems and disadvantages. For example, Ross et al. (1993) argue that this 
approach is useless in many cases because the key assumption is that the 
dividend grows at a constant rate, which is unrealistic. Nevertheless, they show 
that the estimated cost of equity is very sensitive to the estimated growth rate. 
For example, an upward revision of the dividend growth rate of g by just 1% 
increases the estimated cost of equity by at least a full percentage point. Studies 
done by Brigham and Ehrhardt (2005) have shown that analysts’ forecasts 
represent the best source of growth rate data for DCF based cost of equity 
estimates. Since DCF provides results that are more accurate when the input 
data comes from the analysts, Ehrhardt (1994) suggests the use of such 
forecasts, if available. 
Importantly, contrary to risk-return relation in finance, this method does not 
explicitly consider risk. Ross et al. (1993) point out that there is no direct 
adjustment for the riskiness of the investment under DCF. That means that no 
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allowance is made for the degree of certainty or uncertainty surrounding the 
estimated growth rate in dividends. As a result, it is difficult to say whether the 
estimated return meets the return expectations of the equity holders. 
As the results of DCF are controversial, Makholm and Sander (1992) state 
that much of the disagreement in utility rate cases in the U.S. are about 
judgmental questions regarding the use of empirical data. Consequently, they 
conclude that DCF “… is a good tool that is often used poorly.” 
Because of these problems, DCF is not recommended as the only method 
for the calculation. For example, Myers and Borucki (1994) investigate whether 
DCF could be used to estimate the cost of equity for regulated electric and gas 
utilities in the U.S. They calculate the cost of equities under several 
assumptions of dividend growth rates. Then they conclude that DCF results 
could not be used without cross checking the results obtained from other 
methods. 
Apart from the problems caused by assumptions, the DCF formula requires 
adjustment considering real life. Makholm and Sander (1992) introduce four of 
the most common errors in the application of DCF that contribute to rate of 
return disputes and recommend the adjustment of the DCF formula. Table 2 
summarizes the adjustments needed for the common errors as recommended by 
Makholm and Sander (1992). 
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Table 2. The adjustment of the DCF formula 
Common 
errors 
Description Adjustment of DCF formula 
The ex-dividend 
date error 
DCF assumes that common stock 
price of p is observed when the next 
dividend is on the ex-dividend date. 
Therefore it is necessary to remove 
the effect of nearer dividend 
payments from p. 
g
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adj
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radj is the adjusted cost of equity for 
the ex-dividend date, p is the 
observed price of common stock, 
padj is the adjusted common stock 
price, Do is the quantity of the 
previous dividend paid, g is the 
dividend growth rate, Tf is days until 
next ex-dividend date, and Df is the 
quantity of next dividend. 
The current 
dividend yield 
error 
In practice, the current dividend yield is multiplied by half the expected 
dividend growth rate to calculate the next period's dividend. The expected 
dividend payments over the next year should be calculated by multiplying 
the expected long-term dividend growth rate by dividend payments of the 
past periods. 
The sustainable 
growth error 
DCF assumes that the only source of 
equity financing is the retention of 
earnings. However, the issuance and 
the sale of new common stock at 
prices in excess of book value can also 
be a source of earnings growth for 
existing shareholders. 
)()( S*VB*rg av   
B is the percentage of retained 
earnings. rav is the expected return 
on average equity. S is the funds 
raised from the sale of stock as a 
percentage of existing common 
equity. V is the percentage of 
funds raised from the sale of 
common stock that accrues to 
shareholders at the start of the 
period. 
The flotation cost 
error 
The issuance of common equity 
involves both direct expenses and 
underwritings fees. These costs are 
often measured as a percentage of the 
total common equity issuances. 
g
f1p
g1 D
r oadj 


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f is the flotation cost (%). 
Source: Adapted from Makholm and Sander (1992). Note: the adjusted common stock price is the 
observed common stock price minus the accrued dividend. 
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3.4 CAPM 
CAPM states that the cost of equity is the risk free return plus a risk 
adjustment. Risk adjustment is the product of the return on the market, as a 
whole, multiplied by the beta risk measure of the individual firm or project. 
According to CAPM, the relevant risk to be taken into account is not the total 
uncertainty of the investment in itself, but the contribution of the asset or 
project to the total risk of the firm’s cash flows, and ultimately to the risk of the 
shareholders' wealth (Hull, 1980; Sercu and Uppal, 1995; Harvey, 2001). 
CAPM is complex and there are many implicit assumptions, both in CAPM 
itself and in its application. These include, among other things, market 
efficiency, the availability of reliable market betas, single periods, the beta of 
debt being zero, and a perfect market with no taxes and information costs, and 
rational and risk adverse investors with diversified portfolios (Northcott, 1995). 
CAPM could be formulated as the following. 
    
 (2) 
In Eq. 2, Re is the cost of equity, Rf is the risk free rate, Rm is the market 
premium, and βe is the beta of the subject equity relative to the market index. 
Here the definition of the market depends on whether the relevant market is 
integrated or segmented. If integrated, investments are global and systematic 
risk is measured relative to a world market index. If capital markets are 
segmented, investments are made in a particular country and then systematic 
risk is measured relative to a domestic market index. 
CAPM is theoretically sound and supported by academicians. However, 
there are debates regarding the nature of parameters to be used in CAPM. In 
addition, there are problems in applying CAPM to emerging markets where 
capital markets are not developed because CAPM requires inputs such as the 
risk free rate, beta, and the market risk premium. Beta and market risk premium 
are estimated using market data. 
If the government in the emerging market does not issue debt instruments, 
the issue becomes more problematic. Then the question is what comparator data 
could be used. In practice, the international comparator data (mostly U.S. data) 
is used to meet the data requirement. Is this correct method? No, but it is widely 
applied. The use of the comparator data requires special attention because 
different markets apply different tariff regimes and countries issue different debt 
 fmefe RRβRR 
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instruments at different maturities. Therefore, the comparator data should be 
adjusted before use in the capital cost estimation. 
3.5 APT 
Like CAPM, APT assumes a linear relation between systematic risk and 
expected return. In contrast to CAPM, APT argues that many factors, not just 
beta, are important in explaining asset returns. As noted by Butler (2004), the 
main difference from CAPM is that APT takes a more general view of the types 
of risks that might be priced in the market. In this sense, CAPM is a specific 
form of APT. Therefore, in APT, a security`s expected return could be written 
as a linear function of n systematic risk factors (Eq.3). 
    
 (3) 
In Eq. 3, Re is the cost of equity, Rf is the risk free rate, βn is the sensitivity 
to factor n, and fn is the factor affecting expected return. Unfortunately, as stated 
by Fifield et al. (2002), the theory is silent as regards to the number and types of 
these factors. While tests of these models have done much to increase our 
understanding of the manner in which assets are priced, much remains unclear. 
Both CAPM and APT assume that the total variability of an asset’s returns 
can be attributed to two sources: 1) risks that influence all assets to some extent 
in the market, such as the state of the economy, and 2) other risks that are 
specific to a given firm, such as strikes. The former type of risk is usually 
named as systematic, non-diversifiable risk, or market risk, and the latter as 
unsystematic or diversifiable risk. Unsystematic risk is largely irrelevant to the 
highly diversified holder of securities. Nevertheless, no matter how well 
diversified a stock portfolio is, systematic risk, by definition, cannot be 
eliminated, and thus, the investor must be compensated for bearing this risk. 
In addition to the above models, it is worthwhile mentioning an alternative 
model, the Fama and French`s three-factor model. Like CAPM and APT, this 
model assumes a linear relation between expected return and risk factors. In 
contrast, it uses three different factors for risk in the economy to estimate the 
cost of equity capital for a company: 1) market movements as in beta of CAPM, 
2) the difference between the returns of small and big firms, and 3) high minus 
low book-to-market firms`returns (Franks, 2007; Pratt and Grabowski, 2008). 
Thus, Fama and French's model attempts to measure a company's return in 
nnfe fffRR   2211
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relation to these three coefficients for risks. The model can be formulated as the 
following. 
   
 (4) 
In Eq. 4, Re , Rf , βe , and Rm represent the same variables as in CAPM. βz 
and βd are the sensitivities of a security to a firm size and relative financial 
distress factor respectively. fz is the difference in mean return between the 
smallest 10% of firms and the largest 10% of firms. fd is the difference in mean 
return between portfolios of firms with high and low ratios of book-to-market 
equity (Butler, 2004). The evaluation of these models, particularly from the 
perspective of tariff regulation, is discussed later. 
 
4. The regulators' approach commonly used in estimating the cost of 
capital 
The standard approach adapted by regulatory agencies is to use the 
weighted average cost of capital (WACC). Formally, WACC can be estimated 
by the following equations (5) or (6) depending upon choice: 
 
 
 (5) 
 
 
 (6) 
 
In Eq. 5 and Eq. 6, Re is the cost of equity capital, Rd is the cost of debt, T is 
the tax rate, and D and E are debt and equity ratios in a company. In practice, 
the cost of debt is usually estimated by adding a debt premium to the risk free 
rate (Jenkinson, 2006). However, the cost of equity is usually estimated by 
CAPM formula given below. 
    (7) 
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In Eq. 7, Rf is the risk free rate, βe is the equity beta, while (Rm-Rf) is the 
market risk premium over the risk free return. βe is estimated by regression of 
the utility's stock prices versus market index. Since the observed equity beta 
includes the effect of the capital structure, used before in Eq. 7, it is first 
unlevered and then relevered using the target debt-equity ratio by employing the 
following formula. 
 
   (8) 
 
In Eq. 8, βa is the asset beta (unlevered beta) while βd is the debt beta. Often 
in practice, a simplification is made and βd is typically assumed to be very small 
or equal to zero. However, in general, it is estimated to have a value between 
0.3 and 0.4 (Pratt and Grabowski, 2008). On the other hand, Arnold (2008) 
assumes a debt beta of 0.2-0.3 in his textbook. As an example, regulatory 
decisions assume a debt beta in the range of 0-0.28 in New South Wales in 
Australia (Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal of New South Wales, 
2002). Setting debt beta as zero means that the company can borrow at the risk-
free rate. This assumption is not realistic, but usually used to find the unlevered 
asset beta (Northcott, 1995). 
For the conversion of equity beta βe to eliminate the effect of the capital 
structure, instead of Eq. 8, other conversion methods are also used. For 
example, Damodaran (2010b) makes corrections for cash in unlevered beta 
because cash and marketable securities have betas of around zero. For this 
purpose, Damodaran (2010b) uses the following formula. Unlevered Beta 
corrected for Cash = Unlevered Beta/(1-Cash/Firm Value). The conversion 
methods are listed and explained in Table 3. 
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Table 3. Levered and unlevered beta conversion 
Conversion Method Formula Assumptions 
Hamada  All risks are borne by 
shareholders, βd is 
zero, and debt has tax 
benefits. 
Miles-Ezzell 
 
There is risk in the 
timely realization of 
the tax deductions for 
the interest payments 
on debt. 
Harris-Pringle  The tax shield is more 
risky. 
Fernandez 
 
The ratio of debt to 
book value of equity 
remains constant. 
Practitioners' methods  All risks are borne by 
shareholders, βd is 
zero, and debt has no 
tax benefits. 
Source: Adapted from Pratt and Grabowski (2008). Notes: T is the effective tax rate, 
D/E is debt-equity ratio, and Rd(pt) is the cost of debt prior to tax effect. 
aIt is a version of 
the Hamada method under no tax benefits of debt. 
 
In practice, Hamada and Practitioners' methods are mostly used (Ehrhardt, 
1994). If debt beta is assumed not to equal to zero, then the Hamada method 
becomes as the following (Damodaran, 2003a). 
 
   (9) 
 
In practice, the risk free rate is relatively easy to observe and the 
government debt instruments are generally accepted as risk free tools. The most 
controversial parameters of CAPM are the market risk premium and beta 
values. There are a large number of different viewpoints particularly about 
market risk premium. For example, Welch (2000a, 2000b) states that market 
risk premium can be different depending on the inputs used when estimating it, 
such as stock market indices, bonds, and historical time periods. Thus, he warns 
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users of market risk premium estimates to check which definition is used and 
the reason for the selection as well. 
On the other hand, a survey by Bruner et al. (1998) for market risk premium 
used by practitioners in the U.S. provides that 37% of the respondents use a 
premium between 5-6%, and another 11% use an even lower value. Another 
survey by Welch (2008) reports that 1-year market risk premium and 30-year 
geometric market risk premium are about 5% at the end of 2007, and the sample 
interquartile range is 4% to 6%. Koller et al. (2005) recommends that the 
appropriate market risk premium be in the range of 4.5% to 5.5%. 
5. Evaluation of the methods 
The widely used methods of CAPM and DCF dominate in the estimation of 
cost of equity (Grout, 1994). In the UK, regulators mostly use CAPM 
(Jenkinson, 2006). On the other hand, recent surveys find that CAPM is by far 
the most widely used method, especially by large U.S. firms (Bruner et al., 
1998; Graham and Harvey, 2001). In addition, almost 74% of respondents in 
one survey, and 85% in the other, state that they use CAPM (Brigham and 
Ehrhardt, 2005). However, there is a big variation in the implementation of 
CAPM among practitioners (Bruner et al., 1998). 
The general application uses CAPM to assess the cost of equity and then 
uses DCF and other methods as a crosschecks (Franks, 2007). However, in 
practice, there is no doubt that, in estimating the cost of equity, both careful 
analysis and sound judgments are required (Brigham and Ehrhardt, 2005). 
CAPM has two main advantages over other methods. First, it explicitly 
adjusts for risk. Second, it is applicable to companies whether they pay 
dividends or not. Thus, it may be useful in a wide variety of circumstances. 
Nevertheless, it has some disadvantages also. It requires that the market risk 
premium and the beta coefficient are estimated. Finally as with DCF, we 
essentially rely on the past to predict the future. When we use CAPM, economic 
conditions can change very quickly and past data may not be a good guide to 
the future (Ross et al., 1993). 
In their empirical study for comparative computation of the cost of equity 
for regulated utilities, Roll and Ross (1998) conclude that APT provides a 
superior method, from both theoretical and pragmatic perspectives. They point 
out that CAPM has consistently underestimated the cost of equity for the 
utilities relative to their historic equity capital costs. Furthermore, they 
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demonstrate its application to a sample mixture of utilities from different sectors 
including energy, and derive much more sensible estimates of the cost of equity 
than those produced by CAPM. 
In general, academics state that APT and the Fama and French's three-factor 
model provide a sounder theoretical basis than CAPM for determining the cost 
of capital. Moreover, it is a more sensible methodology for such computations 
in tariff regulation (Franks, 2007). In contrary, the survey conducted by Welch 
(2008) reports that for corporate capital budgeting purposes 75% of finance 
professors recommend CAPM, 10% recommend the Fama and French's three 
factor model, and 5% recommend an APT model. 
Despite their theoretical strengths, APT and the Fama and French's three-
factor model require a large amount of good quality data. Unfortunately, there 
are not enough empirical studies for its application in tariff regulation. Although 
theoretically acceptable, APT will not help energy regulators at least in the 
foreseeable future because there are still questions as to which parameters need 
to be inputted into APT formula. 
6. Models for developing markets 
The models discussed in detail in earlier sections work for mature markets, 
not for developing markets, mainly due to the unavailability or poor quality of 
the required data. For this reason, generally the modified or adjusted versions of 
CAPM are recommended to calculate the cost of equity in developing markets 
(Sabal, 2004; Harvey, 2005; Pereiro, 2006). The proposed models, essentially, 
suggest adding a country risk premium, or adjusting or modifying the beta, or 
using other risk parameters instead of beta in CAPM (Bekaert and Harvey, 
2002; Sabal, 2004; Pereiro, 2006). 
There are several suggestions on how to calculate the country risk premium. 
For example, Copeland et al. (2000) recommend the following. Country risk 
premium = (Country sovereign risk premium - credit risk premium - inflation 
differential). Country sovereign risk premium can be calculated as the 
difference between the interest rate on a local bond denominated in U.S. dollars 
and a U.S. government bond of similar maturity. Credit risk premium for a 
country's rated bond can be estimated by taking the difference between the yield 
to maturity on 10-year U.S. corporate bonds of the same rating with the country 
rated bond and the 10-year U.S. government bonds. 
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The major reasoning behind these versions are that developing markets pose 
greater risks to investors, and thus investors deserve additional premium for the 
risks they assume in developing markets. However, in recent years, this view 
has been questioned and it is argued that investment in developing markets 
actually reduces the risk attached to the overall cash flows of an international 
company (McRae, 1996). Moreover it provides opportunities for diversification 
benefits for the companies, due to the low correlation between developed and 
developing markets. 
In practice, for tariff regulation in developing countries, country risk 
premium is added to the cost of equity calculated by CAPM for a proxy U.S. 
utility. Unfortunately, there is no literature suggesting the use of the other 
methods covered in earlier sections, such as the risk premium approach, APT, 
or the Fama Fama and French`s three-factor model, or even the use of DCF for 
regulatory purposes, probably due to the immature nature of capital markets in 
developing markets. 
Pereiro (2001, 2006), Sabal (2004), Harvey (2005), and Estrada (2007) 
discuss some models with the global applicability. Among the models covered 
by these authors, some add sovereign risk premium instead of risk free rate in 
the CAPM formula. Some models add country risk premium to the cost of 
equity estimated for a U.S. utility using CAPM. Furthermore, some models use 
the relative volatility of the local market with regard to the U.S. market instead 
of beta of the CAPM. It is obvious that the models considering volatility as a 
parameter in the estimation will likely produce higher cost of capital values for 
countries with unstable markets. 
The other model, the implied cost of capital, is based on finding the cost of 
equity by discounting cash flows to equity holders. This model assumes that the 
stocks are priced correctly. But, it is only applicable in efficient financial 
markets. 
Another model suggested by Bekaert and Harvey (1995) includes the 
evolution of the financial integration between countries in the model. The model 
is based on a time-varying methodology. However, the difficulty is in 
calculating the degree of financial integration and including it in the formula. 
The dynamic model of Bekaert and Harvey (1995) is problematic because an 
incentive based tariff regime does not envision any adjustment in the tariff 
formula during the implementation period once the parameters are set at the 
beginning of the period. Another model, known as the Erb, Harvey, and 
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Viskanta Model (Erb et al., 1995; Erb et al., 1996), establishes a relation 
between the cost of equity and the country credit rating. This model could be an 
alternative for those markets with no stock exchanges. In addition, even the 
Arbitrage Pricing Theory has a strong theoretical acceptance, there is no clear 
guideline for the type and number of inputs to the model. 
It is important to note that all the versions are developed to estimate the 
appropriate cost of capital for investments in the international setting from the 
perspective of investors in developed countries. This means that the proposed 
versions do not consider the return expectations of the local investors. On the 
other hand, finance theory clearly informs us that the cost of capital should 
reflect only non-diversifiable risk. 
As also stated by Copeland et al. (2005), most agree that diversifiable risk is 
handled better in the cash flows. Thus adding country risk premium in the 
estimation formula is questionable, as it ignores the diversification effect of the 
investment. In the case of rate setting by regulators, the adjustment of the cash 
flow for non-diversifiable risk could only be done by increasing allowed 
revenues to the utility. Nevertheless, the adjustment of the revenues would not 
be a solution if the utility has different shareholders with different return 
expectations. 
Even though a large number of models have been developed for the 
international setting, there are no common approaches accepted by 
academicians and practitioners. For example, Sercu and Uppal (1995) advise to 
check first whether or not there is integration between the concerned markets. 
According to the integration status, either the local CAPM for the country or the 
international CAPM would be selected. The local CAPM uses the beta value 
calculated by the local common stock return against the local market index. On 
the other hand, the international CAPM uses the beta value calculated by the 
local common stock return against the international market. Although some 
institutions produce international market indexes (For instance, MSCI World 
index), in practice, the U.S. market is taken as proxy for the international 
market. 
Having chosen the model, then the next stage is to obtain estimates of the 
model parameters. In contrast, Shapiro (2003) recommends a pragmatic 
approach for U.S. based companies to measure the betas of international 
operations against the U.S. market portfolio, due to the quality of U.S. capital 
market data derived over a long period of time. 
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In contrast, Sabal (2004) argues that what is important is not the degree of 
integration, but whether the investor concerned is locally or globally diversified. 
Sabal (2004), however, does not answer the question regarding which 
shareholders one is supposed to look at in order to analyze their degrees of 
diversification. In practice, there are utilities whose direct shareholders are not 
diversified at all, but their indirect shareholders are diversified at the national or 
global level. In essence, in energy utilities, the controlling owners do not appear 
as direct shareholders. In many cases, they are indirect shareholders. 
As regards the proposed versions of CAPM, there is no agreement as to 
which model has a theoretical background and could be applied with confidence 
in developing countries. In summary, we can say that, in practice and theory, 
there are different implementations and proposals, which do not provide clear 
and cohesive guidelines for regulators in developing markets. 
7. Capital cost calculations for Turkish energy companies 
7.1 Calculation methodology and input data 
In this article, capital cost is calculated for two electricity companies. The 
first one is Zorlu Enerji Elektrik Üretim A.Ş. (ZOREN), which is electricity 
generator whose shares are traded in Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE). The 
second is regional electricity distribution companies. In Turkey, there are 21 
regional electricity distribution companies. EMRA - Turkish energy regulator - 
regulates the distribution services of these utilities and allows them to gain a 
certain rate of return by tariff regulation. Privatization procedures for 12 
electricity distribution utilities are completed and procedures for others are 
continuing. 
For calculation purposes, the real pre-tax WACC approach (Eq.5) is used to 
estimate the cost of capital for these two utilities. For electricity distribution 
utilities, a sectoral cost of capital is estimated instead of calculating capital cost 
for each utility. The reason is that none of regional distribution utilities are 
publicly traded company. In addition, it is difficult to find the required data and 
differentiate the input data among the utilities. In order to estimate the cost of 
equity, four models applicable to Turkey are selected and listed in Table 4. 
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Definitions of symbols and parameters used in Table 4 
Symbol/Parameter Definition 
Re The cost of equity 
Rfu , Rfw , Rs The U.S. risk free rate, the global risk free rate, and the 
sovereign spread respectively 
Rmu , Rmw The U.S. market return, and the global market return 
respectively 
βu The beta of the U.S. company computed against the U.S. 
market index 
Rc The country risk premium 
 
Table 4. List of selected models applicable to Turkey 
Models Source Cost of equity formula and short 
description 
Country risk premium 
(Rc) is added to the 
CAPM formula instead 
of the U.S. market risk 
premium of (Rmu-Rfu)  
Sabal, 2004 Re=Rfu+βuRc 
The Beta Approach Re=Rfu+βu(Rmu-Rfu+Rc) 
The Bludgeon Approach 
Damodaran, 
2003a, 2003b, 
2009a, 2009b 
Re=Rfu+βu(Rmu-Rfu)+Rc 
The Goldman Sovereign 
Spread Model 
Mariscal and 
Lee, 1993; 
Harvey, 2005 
Re=Rs+βw(Rmw-Rfw) 
1) The cost of equity is calculated by 
adding the country long-term debt rate 
and the global market risk premium. 
Risk Premium Approach Voll et. al., 
1998 
2) The cost of equity is calculated by 
adding the cost of equity for a U.S. utility 
and the country risk premium. 
 
The cost of debt is calculated by adding a margin over the risk free rate for 
Turkey. For example, 10-year Turkish Eurobonds issued in US$ is taken as a 
reference and a certain debt premium is added to the average rate of this debt 
instrument to arrive at a cost of debt figure for energy utilities. 
In general, the rate of a government issued debt instrument is accepted as a 
risk free rate. Because the international debt instrument implicitly includes a 
sovereign premium, the sovereign premium is subtracted from the rate of the 
Turkey’s Eurobond and the long-term future inflation differential between 
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Turkey and the U.S. is added to arrive at a risk free rate for Turkey (Copeland et 
al., 2000). 
As a U.S. risk free rate, the rate of the 10-year U.S. Government bond is 
used. The average rate of 10-year U.S. Government bond for the last 12 months 
is about 2.75% (Wall Street Journal, 2011). It is assumed that the U.S. risk free 
rate represents the world risk free rate and the U.S. market risk premium 
represents the world market risk premium. 
In calculations, the nominal pre-tax WACC is calculated by using Eq.5. 
Then this value is converted to the real pre-tax WACC by using the adjusted 
Fisher formula. The formula can be written as (1+nominal-pre tax WACC) = 
(1+real pre-tax WACC value) x (1+expected inflation). 
The risk free rate for Turkey is calculated by taking the arithmetic average 
of Eurobonds in US$ issued in 2010 and 2011 and the result is 5.83%. The 
arithmetic average of the spreads for the same bonds during the same period is 
taken as sovereign spread and calculated as 2.04%. This value is also taken as 
country risk premium. 
The sovereign spread of 2.04% is subtracted from the rate of the Turkey’s 
Eurobond of 5.83% and the long-term future inflation differential between 
Turkey and the U.S. is added to arrive at a risk free rate for Turkey. Then a risk 
free rate of 6.79%4 for Turkey is calculated (Copeland et. al., 2005; Central 
Bank of the Republic of Turkey, 2011; InflationData.com, 2011). The long-term 
future inflation rate differential between Turkey and the U.S. is assumed to be 
3.0, considering the inflation performance of both countries in the last 10 years 
and the inflation rate forecasts5. 
The cost of debt is calculated by adding debt premium to the risk free rate 
for Turkey. Debt premium is assumed as 1.50%, considering corporate bond 
spreads over U.S. Treasury Bonds. Furthermore, in practice, a debt premium of 
1.50% has widespread acceptance (Damodaran, 2010b). 
From the studies and comments in Koller et al. (2005) and Welch (2008), 
market risk premium is reported at most 6%. The Federal Reserve Bank of 
Cleveland (2011) reports that its latest estimate of 10-year expected inflation is 
1.83%. 
                                                        
4 It is the result of (5.83 - 2.04 + 3.00). 
5 The inflation data for Turkey is obtained from the internet site of Central Bank of the Republic 
of Turkey and the U.S. inflation data is obtained from InflationData.com. 
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Since there is no listed electricity distribution utility in ISE, the comparator 
data is used for beta value. In general, asset beta for electricity distribution 
utilities ranges between 0.35-0.50. For example, Independent Pricing and 
Regulatory Tribunal of New South Wales (2002) reports an asset beta of 0.35-
0.50 for Australian electricity distribution utilities and Damodaran (2010c, 
2010d) calculates asset beta of 0.46-0.49 for electricity utilities in different 
regions of the U.S. Since electricity distribution utilities under incentive-based 
regulation face more risk, the highest value of the range is used in calculations. 
On the other hand, the shares of ZOREN - the selected electricity producer - 
have been quoted in ISE since May, 2000. Because there are no good quality 
data series for beta calculations, the comparator data for the beta value is also 
used for ZOREN. As a comparator data, an asset beta of 0.70 for ZOREN is 
used in the calculations (Damodaran, 2010c; Damodaran, 2010d). 
Asset beta values are converted to equity beta values using the Hamada 
conversion method used before in the selected cost of equity models (See Table 
3). 
Even though there is room for tax benefits from higher leverage, half of the 
capital structure of the utilities is foreseen as equity. Therefore, the beta applied 
to utilities reflects the target gearing. 
The parameters used in the calculations are summarized in Table 5. 
Table 5. List of parameters 
Parameters Value 
 Electricity Distribution 
Co. 
ZOREN 
Risk free rate for Turkey (%) 6.79 6.79 
Risk free rate for the U.S. (%) 2.75 2.75 
Debt premium (%) 1.50 1.50 
Cost of debt (%) (6.79 + 1.50) 8.29 8.29 
Market risk premium (%) 6.00 6.00 
Asset beta (unlevered beta) 0.50 0.70 
Equity beta (levered beta) 0.90 1.26 
Debt/equity ratio (%/%) 50% / 50%  50% / 50% 
Country risk premium/sovereign risk 
(%) 
2.04 2.04 
Statutory tax rate (%) 20 20 
10 year expected inflation rate for the 
U.S. (%) 
1.83 1.83 
Long-term inflation rate difference for 
Turkey and the U.S. (%) 
3.00 3.00 
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7.2 Results and discussion 
Cost of capital estimation results are summarized in Table 6. 
Table 6. Weighted average cost of capital estimates 
Real pre-tax WACC (%)  
Model 
Formula for 
estimating 
cost of equity 
Electricity Distribution 
Co. 
ZOREN 
Rc is added instead 
of the U.S. market 
risk premium. 
Re= Rfu+βuRc 5.09 5.54 
Beta Approach Re=Rfu+βu(Rmu-Rfu+Rc) 8.41 10.18 
Bludgeon 
Approach 
Re= Rfu+βu(Rmu-Rfu)+Rc 8.52 9.85 
The Goldman 
Sovereign Spread 
Model  
Re=Rs+βw(Rmw-Rfw) 6.84 8.17 
1) Re= Rfl+(Rmu-Rfu) 10.12 10.12 Risk premium 
approach 2) Re for a utility in 
Turkey=Re for a utility 
in the U.S.+Rc 
8.52 9.85 
As seen from Table 6, the results of risk premium approach -1 for both 
companies are the same, which is unrealistic because two utilities have different 
beta values. This specific method does not consider the differences in risk 
profiles of the utilities. In addition, the model based on addition of a country 
risk premium instead of the U.S. market risk premium provides unrealistic 
results for both utilities, which are even below the risk free rate for Turkey. The 
Goldman Sovereign Spread Model provides a result for electricity distribution 
utility, which is very close to the risk free rate for Turkey. Except for the results 
below the cost of debt and, of the risk premium approach -1, the real pre-tax 
WACC for electricity distribution utility changes from 8.41% to 8.52% and for 
ZOREN from 9.85% to 10.18%. 
8. Policy guidelines to regulators 
From a finance point of view, the cost of equity capital is viewed as an 
opportunity cost. This is the return that the investor would expect to make on 
other investments of similar risk. The cost of capital value is not an exact value 
because it requires forward-looking and subjective evaluation. Importantly, it is 
based on the investors` risk profile. Hence, it is wrong to calculate a single cost 
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of capital value. It is better to estimate the cost of capital value in a range with 
lower and higher figures (Sabal, 2004; Arnold, 2008). 
Arnold (2008) argues that precision is less important than knowledge about 
the reasonable range and he recommends focusing on estimating the boundaries 
for the range of values. The minimum value of the range must be set, at least, at 
a value to encourage the interested parties to invest in the sector. On the other 
hand, the maximum value must be set, at most, at the highest value that could 
be earned from alternative investments in a competitive market (Kahn, 1989). 
CAPM based models only estimate the minimum cost of capital values and 
do not recommend any maximum value. If a country is facing security of energy 
supply or is projected to face a shortage in terms of network investments, 
regulators should allow a reasonable return in order to maintain the interests of 
the existing shareholders, and attract more investment to the sector. 
In setting the cost of capital, energy regulators should review other cost of 
capital values determined by, if any, other regulators in the home country and 
cooperate with them. The difference between the estimated costs of capital 
among regulated energy and non-energy utilities of similar risks would 
negatively affect the investment flow among sectors. As proposed by Mayer and 
Franks (Franks, 2007), one solution would be to appoint a standing committee 
that would review new evidence for cost of capital estimation and provide 
regular updates both on existing and new models, and estimate the relevant 
variables required for the models. 
Different investors probably have different expected rate of returns, since 
they see different amounts of risk in the same investment. The various versions 
of CAPM assume a homogenous and rational shareholder structures with 
diversified portfolio, and do not give answers for shareholder structure with 
different return expectations. Therefore, according to the assumptions of the 
standard CAPM, the shareholders of energy utilities and their portfolio 
strategies are more important than the degree of market integration. This is 
important because energy regulators should first identify the shareholders of 
energy utility and identify whether they diversify away their unsystematic risk 
or not. Even if this approach is accepted, some questions remain unanswered. 
Will the regulator be required to evaluate only direct shareholders of the utility 
or all shareholders behind direct shareholders, until all indirect shareholders are 
real persons in the utility’s ownership structure? Assuming that all direct and 
indirect legal entity shareholders are not diversified and only the indirect 
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individual shareholders have diversified portfolios, in this case, which 
shareholders will be counted in the analysis? To make it clear, at what level of 
shareholders will regulators evaluate whether shareholders are diversified or 
not? This will certainly burden regulators who will have to collect the 
information needed for this type of analysis. 
In risk-return relations, what matters is not the energy utility itself. As 
stated earlier, it is the shareholders of the utility that matter most, whether they 
are diversified locally or globally (Sabal, 2004). As long as the shareholders of 
two utilities are not exactly the same, the estimated cost of capital for these 
utilities would likely be different, subject to other things being similar in the 
utilities. Therefore, it is not logical to apply the same rate of return value to all 
utilities and each utility must be treated differently. 
9. Concluding remarks 
Cost of capital is a hot issue in finance. Approaches and suggestions in 
either theory or practice in setting a cost of capital for energy utilities do not 
provide clear answers or guidelines for energy regulators. Nevertheless, 
regulators are authorized to allow a fair rate of return to energy utilities while 
taking necessary measures to protect consumers. The available models estimate 
cost of capital figures on an industry basis or countrywide. This will be 
irrelevant if the network utility is not owned wholly by the same shareholders or 
the shareholders of the network utilities are not homogenous in terms of return 
expectations. However, regulators need to consider differences if the network 
utility has shareholders with different risk return expectations. Unfortunately, 
there is no clear solution to solve this challenging issue. How to harmonize 
different return expectations is an area that requires further thought and 
research. 
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